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What do Motorola, Medion and Volvo have in common? 
They were (fully or partially) acquired by Chinese compa-
nies in the past four years. The same is true for some of 
Germany’s “hidden champions”, such as Putzmeister and 
Schwing (manufacturers of concrete pumps), Kiekert and 
Sellner (automotive suppliers), Solibro and Sunways (PV 
manufacturers). Chinese companies are increasing their 
acquisitions of Western businesses. Most importantly, they 
target high-tech industries and well-known brands. The 
phenomenon of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) 
from China is not entirely new. Their recent expansion to 
Europe and North America, however, may appear exotic 
from a western perspective, since large waves of inward 
foreign direct investment (IFDI) flowed into China for 
more than two decades, whereas OFDI from China was 
low. Growth rates have been high, though, especially 
since the central government proclaimed the “going glo-
bal” strategy in 2000: In only 14 years, Chinese OFDI 
Chinese investors are welcome! Germany’s Federal Minister of Economy, 
Sigmar Gabriel, made this clear at the opening ceremony of the Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce in Berlin in January 2014. His words were not only 
meant as an invitation to Chinese companies, but also as a piece of advice 
for Germany’s business community and broader public. Chinese investors are 
often perceived to be going on a “global shopping spree” with a “political 
checkbook”, not only in Germany but everywhere in Europe. Some obser-
vers even suggest stricter controls for investors from specific countries, such as 
China. The German government is right to pursue the principle of a free trade 
and investment regime, while insisting that China’s government should level 
the playing field for foreign companies, too.
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international competitiveness, to creating global brands, 
and to strengthening their research and development 
(R&D) capacities.
 Chinese decision-makers in politics and business as-
sume that these goals will be achieved through OFDI in 
developed countries. Therefore, these are one of the foci 
of both the government’s “going global“ strategy and the 
internationalization strategy of a large number of Chi-
nese companies that plan to invest abroad or have already 
done so. While over two thirds of the Chinese OFDI stock 
are accumulated in Asia, the European Union (EU) and 
North America have started to catch up in the past de-
cade and, in 2012, held about eleven percent (2005: 3.6 
percent). Within the European Union, Germany ranked 
third as investment destination in this year, right after 
the United Kingdom and Luxembourg, where – in the 
past – financial-sector investment played an important 
flows grew more than hundredfold and surged from 0.9 
billion USD in 2000 to 90.2 billion USD in 2013 (Figure 1). 
 Core goals of the “going global” strategy include ac-
cess to markets, resources and cutting-edge technology. 
The political agenda wants Chinese companies to become 
truly global players – Chinese Siemens’, Sonys, and Sam-
sungs – and to part with their role as original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs) to western multinationals. The 
Chinese government regards this as an important pre-
requisite to upgrading the country’s economic structure, 
progressing in the global value chain and reducing Chi-
na's reliance on exports. It also is the explicit goal of the 
government that China shall no longer be the “factory of 
the world” in the 21st century, but rather assume the role 
of the “research lab of the world”. Corporate and politi-
cal interests go hand in hand here, as Chinese companies 
regard their “going global” as a key to enhancing their 
Figure 1: Chinese IFDI and OFDI flows in million USD, 2000 – 2013
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3Chinese companies contribute only 0.2 per cent to ac-
cumulated foreign direct investment in Germany (Fig-
ure 2). Chinese investors are a minority when it comes 
to the acquisition of German companies as well: A re-
cent study by BGM Associates shows that only 16 out of
role. In Germany, OFDI in the manufacturing industry 
have been a focus of Chinese investors. According to the 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), Chinese an-
nual OFDI in Germany grew more than thirtyfold, from 
25 million USD in 2003 to 800 million USD in 2012. 
Germany – “Fertile soil” of Chinese 
companies’ going global?
Such was the headline of an article in a Chinese trade 
magazine in 2006, which praised the advantages of Ger-
many as an investment location and recommended Chi-
nese companies to consider Germany as OFDI destination. 
Since then, Chinese investment flows to Germany have 
grown on an annual average of 66 percent, following the 
data of MOFCOM. Also, Chinese companies have bought 
or invested in at least 80 German businesses according to 
our own research. Chinese investors stem from a country 
that is both fascinating and frightening in German public 
opinion. Their activity in Germany therefore appears to 
attract above-average attention. Reactions from German 
politics, business and the media towards Chinese OFDI 
and especially towards acquisitions are ambivalent: On 
the one hand, the “shopping spree” could result in Ger-
man employment, technology and know-how being sold 
off to China, as it happened with a coking plant in 2006. 
On the other hand, some recent cases have shown that 
German companies may profit from a Chinese investor 
in terms of smart division of labor, improved access to 
the Chinese market and the creation of additional jobs. 
Crunching the numbers, it becomes clear that none of the 
two sides solely meets reality – yet. 
 Although data on Chinese OFDI differ widely, depend-
ing on their source, they show that – no matter which set 
of data we look at – Chinese investment in Germany still 
is marginal despite high two-digit growth rates in recent 
years: According to MOFCOM, Germany held only 0.6 per 
cent of China’s accumulated investment abroad in 2012. 
Data from the German Federal Bank tell a similar story: 
Figure 2: FDI stock in Germany by 
geographical origin in percent, 2012
Source: German Federal Bank 2014
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investment. The “going west” initiative of Chinese compa-
nies may have started from a modest level, but – assum-
ing that growth rates continue to be high – they have the 
potential to catch up in the long run. This development 
will bring about both challenges and opportunities.
(Never) mind the gap? Challenges of 
Chinese investment in Germany
Germany is a highly industrialized country with a com-
plex regulatory framework and mature markets. OFDI 
from emerging economies, such as China, imply chal-
lenges not only for the investing companies but also for 
Germany as the receiving entity. There is a wide gap be-
tween Germany and China regarding their political, cul-
tural, economic and legal systems. 
 Chinese companies are buying an increasing number 
of German technology leaders. Among the Chinese acquir-
ers, there have been a large number of state-owned enter-
prises, e.g. the new proprietors of Kiekert and Schwing. 
This has brought about public fears of the Chinese govern-
ment entering Germany through the corporate backdoor. 
Chinese government institutions continue to emphasize 
that state-owned firms are “normal” economic actors. This 
is not sufficient to ease these concerns, however.
 Moreover, the long-term effect of Chinese OFDI in 
the form of the acquisitions of German companies is dif-
ficult to estimate, especially since most of them took place 
in the last three years. At first glance, it appears that 
both sides could profit in many cases. The division of 
labor – high-tech in Germany, low-tech in China – chosen 
in some cases, e.g. in the machine tool sector, may be good 
for Germany in terms of value added and the creation of 
high-skilled jobs for now. It also means, however, that 
even more less-skilled jobs and production processes are 
being moved to China or other countries. It further is the 
explicit goal of most of the Chinese parent companies to 
use their German subsidiary as a training center for their 
staff in order to strengthen R&D facilities in China, which 
1,170 acquisitions in 2012, or 1.3 percent, were conducted 
by Chinese investors.
 Due to varying definitions, the total number of Chi-
nese companies in Germany is difficult to assess, rang-
ing from 62 (German Federal Bank, 2014, including only 
those companies with a balance sheet total of at least three 
million Euro) to over 2,000 (Chinese Embassy in Ger-
many/China Radio International, 2014, no restrictions). 
Even if one takes the higher number, it is way below the 
estimated 5,000 to 8,200 German companies in China. 
This also yields a strong asymmetry in Sino-German 
investment relations: In 2011, Germany’s accumulated 
investment in China was more than eightfold that of Chi-
nese companies in Germany. 
 The Chinese government is determined to change this 
situation. The so-called country-industry register there-
fore explicitly recommends Chinese companies to invest 
in Germany, especially in the machine tool and automo-
tive sector, but also in information technology and renew-
able energy. The guide book “Invest in Germany” by MOF-
COM in part even reads like a marketing brochure of a 
German investment promotion agency: the authors praise 
“made in Germany” as a token of quality, point to Ger-
many’s world-famous consumer and industrial brands, 
draw attention to the deeply-rooted awareness of environ-
mental protection and emphasize Germany’s reputation 
as a high-tech nation. The section on Germany’s business 
environment also highlights that foreign investors basi-
cally enjoy market access equal to German businesses, 
and that by and large there are no specific restrictions for 
foreign investors in certain industries. From a Chinese 
vantage point, Germany offers an open investment envi-
ronment and does not discriminate against foreign inves-
tors in regard to their country of origin.
 In the eyes of Chinese companies, access to markets, 
technology, know-how, brand names and distribution 
channels are among the top motives for investing in Ger-
many, which thus indeed is a “fertile soil” for Chinese 
5ception of Chinese OFDI in Germany has become more 
differentiated in recent years, but fears of Germany’s 
technological sale to China linger on. Even though these 
perceptions partially are nourished by prejudices, both 
the Chinese and the German sides have to deal with them. 
Small, yet growing – Opportunities 
of Chinese investment in Germany
Although Chinese OFDI in Germany still is in its infant 
stage, it is worthwhile to address the opportunities these 
investments may offer for the German economy and Ger-
man business. From an economic perspective, growing 
OFDI flows from China to Germany could gradually ease 
the imbalance of mutual investment between Germany 
and China, which would strengthen the interconnectivity 
of the two markets and their distribution networks. Chi-
nese OFDI may create jobs and additional value added and 
thus contribute to overall economic growth. 
 In fact, Chinese investors already have created employ-
ment opportunities in Germany and in the case of some 
acquisitions even saved jobs threatened by the insolvency 
has been characteristic especially for acquisitions in the 
machine tool sector. Transfer of know-how and technology 
will thus be unavoidable in the long run. This may happen 
even more quickly than presumed, since Chinese compa-
nies have shown in the past that they are able to learn 
quickly. Which parts of the value chain will remain in 
Germany after an acquisition, when Chinese companies 
take more and more links back to China, therefore is an 
important question. 
 On the corporate level, Chinese investors have to 
deal with differences in management styles, notions of 
doing business and approaches to strategic planning. 
These challenges intensify in the case of acquisitions, as 
two diverging corporate cultures have to be reconciled. 
This post-merger integration, which is crucial for an 
acquisition to succeed, is a complex task even for com-
panies from the same cultural background. Industry-
specific issues may add to the difficulty of the integra-
tion process: In the crisis-shaken solar sector, Chinese 
acquirers appeared to be the saviors of struggling com-
panies and their employees first, but in some cases had 
troubles to live up to these expectations (e.g. Sunways). 
  The acquired German company has to develop cop-
ing strategies regarding its customers, employees and 
the public. Customers fear a negative impact on product 
quality due to the new proprietor from a country known 
for cheap “made in China” trash. Employees are afraid of 
their jobs being outsourced to China and the international 
reputation of their employer being damaged when it sud-
denly becomes Chinese. Kiekert and Putzmeister had to 
engage in intensive communication with customers and 
employee representatives in order to reconcile them with 
the idea of a Chinese proprietor. Since the role of trade 
unions and employee participation in corporate decisions 
in Germany generally differ from the situation in China, 
Chinese investors themselves will have to learn to deal 
with this part of Germany business culture, which for 
most of them is a new and strange experience. Public per-
Number of 
companies
Employees
(in thousand) 
Turnover 
(billion Euro)
All countries 14,999 2,740 1,488.2
Netherlands 2,821 624 297.7
Luxembourg 1,987 322 136.9
United States 1,406 287 134.6
China 62 5 2.1
Table 1: Characteristics of major 
foreign investors in Germany compared 
with Chinese investors, 2012
Source: German Federal Bank 2014
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and to concentrate on their core competence in the high-
tech segment.
 To sum up, the overall effect Chinese investment 
has on the German economy is still small, especially in 
comparison with other foreign investors in Germany. For 
a German company that has been bought by a Chinese 
investor, the new ownership may imply a range of oppor-
tunities, which could even outweigh the challenges.
Outlook on Chinese 
investment in Germany
Chinese investors go west and come to Germany. Here, 
Chinese OFDI has been on the rise in the last decade. 
While its accumulated level is currently too low to have 
any substantial impact on the German economy, they 
may positively impact individual businesses. In public 
opinion, skepticism is still strong in regard to investment 
“made in China”, whereas high-level German politicians 
have started to actively encourage Chinese investment 
and to refute possibilities of stricter controls on both 
trade and FDI, as they appeared on the EU agenda in 
2012 and 2013, respectively. The German government is 
right to pursue the principle of a free trade and invest-
ment regime, while insisting that China’s government 
should level the playing field for foreign companies, too.
 It is crucial to strengthen the exchange between 
pol icy-makers, industry associations and companies in 
Germany so to better understand mutual expectations 
and to reduce misunderstandings. This was an impor-
tant topic during the first two rounds of Sino-German in-
tergovernmental consultations in 2011 and 2012. It was 
against this backdrop that China founded the Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce in Berlin. The Chamber pursues 
the goal to help Chinese investors to find their footing 
in the German business environment. It also aims to 
engage with government institutions and the broader 
public in both countries. The next round of intergovern-
mental consultations will take place in fall of 2014 and 
of the targeted company (e.g. Sellner). Compared to Ger-
many’s most important foreign investors, among them the 
Netherlands or the United States, Chinese companies’ im-
pact on the job market has been limited so far (Table 1). 
They currently employ about 5,000 employees. We must 
consider, though, that Chinese businesses have only re-
cently started to increase their investments in Germany 
and thus are latecomers compared with companies that 
have invested there for several decades. 
 For German companies, acquisition by a Chinese com-
pany can be an interesting opportunity. Just as Chinese 
investors regard Germany as their “door to Europe”, they 
may in turn help open the “door to Asia” for their German 
subsidiaries. Especially German Mittelstand companies 
with their restricted resources may find it advantageous 
to push their expansion on the Chinese market under the 
umbrella of a Chinese parent company with well-estab-
lished distribution channels. Kiekert opted for a Chinese 
company because China is one of the most important 
markets for the automotive industry. Moreover, a growing 
number of German family-owned businesses have to look 
for external investors as successors. Since many Chinese 
acquirers pursue the goal to gain a long-term foothold on 
the German market, some of them have been willing to 
commit to a specific corporate location and even give out 
a job guarantee to the employees for several years (e.g. 
Putzmeister and Medion). If this is the case, the fit of Chi-
nese investors with the traditional German Mittelstand is 
far better than that of short-term oriented financial inves-
tors from other countries, which may only have the goal 
of reselling the company bit by bit.
 The division of labor mentioned above may create 
positive synergy effects on the corporate level if the pro-
duction of technology-intensive components remains in 
Germany, whereas low-tech production processes are 
outsourced to China. German companies struggling with 
high production cost may have the chance to increase 
their competitive edge on the German and other markets 
7as a destination for Chinese investment. Our prognosis 
based on MOFCOM data shows that annual Chinese OFDI 
flows to Germany will at least triple again until 2020, 
reaching 2.2 billion USD that year (Figure 3). As the num-
ber of Chinese companies in Germany and that of their 
German employees continues to grow, both sides will face 
the challenge to contribute to narrowing down the gaps 
between them. Chinese companies may have to find an 
approach to their new identity as part of German business 
and society. The latter might have to come to terms with 
the fact that Chinese companies – just as Japanese and 
South Korean ones did before – will become an integral 
part of the German economy. It will be interesting to see 
in how far this leads to mutual impact, i.e. Chinese com-
panies influencing Germany’s business environment and 
vice versa.
may present an opportunity for a first discussion on the 
Chamber’s work.
 For Chinese companies in Germany, it might prove 
helpful to put a stronger emphasis on direct and trans-
parent communication not only with their customers but 
also with other important stakeholders in German busi-
ness and society. Especially when it comes to an acquisi-
tion, the communication strategy of the Chinese acquir-
er may play a crucial role in allaying the fears of those 
actors directly involved, such as the employees, and also 
in easing the more diffuse concerns of the broader pub-
lic. The results will impact public perception on specific 
cases of Chinese acquisitions, but also on Chinese OFDI 
in Germany in general.
 In the future, Chinese companies will intensify their 
efforts to catch up in terms of market access, technology 
and management know-how through OFDI. Given its tech-
nology leadership in key industries, its central geographic 
position in Europe and its highly skilled workforce, Ger-
many has all the advantages to remain highly attractive 
Figure 3: Chinese OFDI flows to Germany, 2003 – 2020
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